PQC in CBOM Output¶

Overview¶

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) assessment evaluates each cryptographic asset for vulnerability to quantum computing attacks. The CBOM Generator classifies every algorithm, certificate, and protocol to help you plan your migration to quantum-resistant cryptography.

PQC Status Categories¶

Each cryptographic asset receives one of five status classifications:

Status	Meaning	Action Required
SAFE	Quantum-resistant algorithm	None - already protected
TRANSITIONAL	Vulnerable but acceptable for now	Plan migration before break year
DEPRECATED	Weak regardless of quantum threat	Migrate immediately
UNSAFE	Highly vulnerable, short break timeline	Prioritize migration
UNKNOWN	Cannot be classified	Manual review needed

SAFE¶

Assets classified as SAFE use quantum-resistant algorithms:

NIST-Finalized PQC: ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)
Symmetric 256-bit: AES-256, ChaCha20-256
Hash 256-bit+: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, BLAKE2b

Symmetric algorithms with 256-bit keys remain secure under Grover's algorithm, which only halves effective key strength.

TRANSITIONAL¶

Assets that are secure today but will become vulnerable when large-scale quantum computers exist:

RSA >= 2048 bits: RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096
ECDSA >= 256 bits: ECDSA-P256, ECDSA-P384, ECDSA-P521
Edwards curves: Ed25519, Ed448
Key exchange: X25519, X448, ECDH
Symmetric 128/192-bit: AES-128, AES-192

These algorithms should be migrated before their estimated break year.

DEPRECATED¶

Cryptographically weak regardless of quantum computing:

Broken hashes: MD5, SHA-1
Weak ciphers: RC4, DES, 3DES, Blowfish
Export-grade: 40-bit and 56-bit ciphers
NULL ciphers: No encryption

Migrate these immediately - they're already insecure.

UNSAFE¶

High-priority migration targets with short break timelines:

Small RSA: RSA-1024, RSA-512
Small ECDSA: ECDSA-P192
DSA: All key sizes
Weak DH: DH parameters < 2048 bits

These are vulnerable to both classical and quantum attacks.

Classification Philosophy¶

Libraries: Worst-Case Classification¶

Libraries are classified based on the weakest algorithm they implement:

Library Implements	Classification	Rationale
AES-256 + RSA-2048 + MD5	DEPRECATED	MD5 is deprecated
AES-256 + RSA-2048	TRANSITIONAL	RSA-2048 is quantum-vulnerable
AES-256 + ML-KEM-768	SAFE	Both are PQC-safe

Services/Applications: Best-Case Classification¶

Services are classified based on the strongest configured algorithm:

Service Configured With	Classification
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + curve25519-sha256	TRANSITIONAL
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + sntrup761x25519	SAFE
SSLv3 + RC4 only	DEPRECATED

Break Year Estimates¶

Break year indicates when an algorithm is expected to become vulnerable to quantum attack, based on NIST IR 8413 and NSA CNSA 2.0 guidance:

Algorithm/Key Size	Break Year	Urgency
RSA-1024, MD5, SHA-1, DES	2030	CRITICAL
RSA-2048, ECDSA-P256, Ed25519	2035	HIGH
RSA-3072, ECDSA-P384	2040	MEDIUM
RSA-4096, ECDSA-P521	2045	LOW
ML-KEM, ML-DSA, AES-256	Never	None

Data retention consideration: If your encrypted data must remain confidential beyond the break year, migrate sooner. An attacker can capture encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once quantum computers are available ("harvest now, decrypt later").

Migration Urgency Levels¶

Urgency	Timeline	Recommended Action
CRITICAL	Break by 2030	Immediate migration required
HIGH	Break by 2035	Begin migration planning now
MEDIUM	Break by 2040	Include in 3-5 year roadmap
LOW	Break by 2045	Monitor standards development

Readiness Score¶

The PQC readiness score (0-100%) is calculated as:

score = (SAFE×100 + TRANSITIONAL×50 + DEPRECATED×20 + UNSAFE×0) / total

PQC KEX Detection¶

The generator recognizes Post-Quantum key exchange algorithms:

Pattern	Algorithm	Type
`sntrup761*`	NTRU Prime hybrid	OpenSSH
`mlkem` / `kyber`	ML-KEM/Kyber	TLS 1.3
`dilithium` / `mldsa`	ML-DSA/Dilithium	Signatures

Enabling PQC in Selected Services¶

OpenSSH (v9.0+)¶

# /etc/ssh/sshd_config
KexAlgorithms sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,curve25519-sha256

Nginx (OpenSSL 3.2+)¶

ssl_ecdh_curve X25519MLKEM768:X25519:P-256;

Apache (OpenSSL 3.2+)¶

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves X25519MLKEM768:X25519:P-256

CBOM Output Properties¶

PQC assessment adds properties to each cryptographic component in the CBOM:

Component Properties¶

{
  "type": "cryptographic-asset",
  "name": "RSA-2048",
  "cryptoProperties": {
    "assetType": "algorithm",
    "algorithmProperties": {
      "primitive": "pke",
      "parameterSetIdentifier": "2048"
    }
  },
  "properties": [
    { "name": "cbom:pqc:status", "value": "TRANSITIONAL" },
    { "name": "cbom:pqc:break_estimate", "value": "2035" },
    { "name": "cbom:pqc:migration_urgency", "value": "HIGH" },
    { "name": "cbom:pqc:rationale", "value": "RSA-2048 is quantum-vulnerable; plan PQC migration" }
  ]
}

Property	Description
`cbom:pqc:status`	Classification: SAFE, TRANSITIONAL, DEPRECATED, UNSAFE, UNKNOWN
`cbom:pqc:break_estimate`	Year when algorithm becomes vulnerable
`cbom:pqc:migration_urgency`	Priority level: CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW
`cbom:pqc:rationale`	Explanation of the classification
`cbom:pqc:is_hybrid`	"true" if hybrid PQC+classical algorithm
`cbom:pqc:alternative`	Recommended PQC replacement algorithm
`cbom:pqc:confidence`	Classification confidence: HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW
`cbom:pqc:source`	Standards reference (e.g., "NIST IR 8413")

Metadata Properties¶

The CBOM metadata includes aggregate PQC statistics:

{
  "metadata": {
    "properties": [
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:readiness_score", "value": "60" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:safe_count", "value": "45" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:transitional_count", "value": "120" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:unsafe_count", "value": "5" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:deprecated_count", "value": "3" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:break_2030_count", "value": "8" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:break_2035_count", "value": "95" },
      { "name": "cbom:pqc:assessment_date", "value": "2025-01-15T10:30:00Z" }
    ]
  }
}

The PQC Migration Report¶

The --pqc-report flag generates a comprehensive, human-readable migration report that provides actionable guidance for transitioning to quantum-resistant cryptography.

Generating the Report¶

./cbom-generator --pqc-report /path/to/report.txt [directories-to-scan]

The report is generated alongside the standard CBOM output, providing a text-based summary suitable for management review and compliance documentation.

Report Sections¶

Executive Summary¶

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
-----------------
Total Cryptographic Assets: 160
PQC-Safe Assets: 8 (5.0%)
Quantum-Vulnerable Assets: 48 (30.0%)
Hybrid Deployments: 2

Quick overview showing your total cryptographic inventory, how many assets are already quantum-safe, how many need migration, and whether you have any hybrid PQC deployments.

Vulnerability Breakdown by Break Year¶

VULNERABILITY BREAKDOWN BY BREAK YEAR
--------------------------------------
CRITICAL (Break by 2030):      7 assets  [IMMEDIATE ACTION]
   - MD5, SHA-1, RC4, DES, RSA-1024 (already weakened classically)

HIGH (Break by 2035):          4 assets  [PLAN MIGRATION NOW]
   - RSA-2048, ECDSA-P256, ECDH-P256 (NIST baseline, NSA CNSA 2.0 deadline)

MEDIUM (Break by 2040):        0 assets  [MONITOR CLOSELY]
   - RSA-3072, ECDSA-P384 (conservative estimate)

LOW (Break by 2045+):          0 assets  [LONG-TERM PLAN]
   - RSA-4096, ECDSA-P521 (optimistic, slower quantum progress)

Groups your vulnerable assets by their estimated break year, with clear urgency indicators:

CRITICAL: Already classically weak or breaking by 2030
HIGH: NSA CNSA 2.0 deadline of 2035
MEDIUM: Conservative 2040 timeline
LOW: Extended 2045+ timeline for strongest classical algorithms

Migration Priority Timeline¶

MIGRATION PRIORITY TIMELINE
----------------------------
2024-2027: Pilot PQC deployments, migrate CRITICAL assets (7 by 2030)
2027-2030: Phase 1 migration complete
2030-2035: Phase 2 migration (4 assets by 2035)
2035-2040: Phase 3 migration (0 assets by 2040)
2040-2045: Phase 4 migration (0 assets by 2045)

Provides a phased migration roadmap aligned with industry timelines and regulatory deadlines.

NIST PQC Standards Reference¶

NIST PQC STANDARDS
------------------
- FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation (ML-KEM)
  ML-KEM-512 (Level 1), ML-KEM-768 (Level 3), ML-KEM-1024 (Level 5)

- FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA)
  ML-DSA-44 (Level 2), ML-DSA-65 (Level 3), ML-DSA-87 (Level 5)

- FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA)
  SLH-DSA-SHA2 variants (Levels 1, 3, 5)

Quick reference to the NIST-standardized PQC algorithms you should migrate to.

Specific Recommendations¶

RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------
1. URGENT: Migrate critical assets before 2030
   - Replace MD5/SHA-1 with SHA-256 or SHA3-256
   - Retire RSA-1024 immediately (vulnerable to classical attacks)
   - Replace RC4, DES, 3DES with AES-256-GCM

2. HIGH PRIORITY: Plan migration for assets (2030-2035)
   - RSA-2048 -> ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium3)
   - ECDSA-P256 -> ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium3)
   - ECDH-P256 -> ML-KEM-768 (Kyber768)

3. TRANSITIONAL: Consider hybrid modes for gradual migration
   - X25519-ML-KEM-768 for key exchange
   - P256-ML-DSA-65 for signatures

Actionable recommendations with specific replacement algorithms for each vulnerability category.

Risk Assessment Matrix¶

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
----------------------
| Break Year      | Assets   | Priority Level          |
|-----------------|----------|-------------------------|
| 2030 (CRITICAL) |        7 | IMMEDIATE ACTION        |
| 2035 (HIGH)     |        4 | PLAN NOW                |
| 2040 (MEDIUM)   |        0 | MONITOR CLOSELY         |
| 2045+ (LOW)     |        0 | LONG-TERM PLANNING      |

Visual summary of your risk exposure by timeline.

PQC Readiness Score¶

PQC READINESS SCORE
-------------------
Overall Score: 57.1 / 100
Rating: MODERATE - Significant migration needed

A single numeric score (0-100) representing your organization's quantum readiness:

Score	Rating	Meaning
90-100	Excellent	Minimal migration needed
70-89	Good	Some migration needed
50-69	Moderate	Significant migration needed
30-49	Poor	Extensive migration required
0-29	Critical	Urgent action required

Phased Migration Action Plan¶

MIGRATION ACTION PLAN
---------------------
PHASE 0 (2024-2027): CRITICAL ASSETS
  Scope: 7 assets requiring immediate migration
  Timeline: Complete by 2027
  Actions:
    - Audit all MD5, SHA-1, RC4, DES usage
    - Replace with SHA-256, AES-256-GCM
    - Retire RSA-1024 certificates and keys
  Priority: CRITICAL

PHASE 1 (2027-2030): HIGH PRIORITY ASSETS
  Scope: 4 assets (RSA-2048, ECDSA-P256)
  Timeline: Complete by 2030
  Actions:
    - Deploy hybrid RSA-2048 + ML-DSA-65
    - Transition ECDH-P256 to X25519-ML-KEM-768
  Priority: HIGH

Detailed phase-by-phase migration plan with specific actions, timelines, and scope for each phase.

Compliance References¶

COMPLIANCE & GOVERNANCE
-----------------------
Regulatory Requirements:
  - NIST SP 800-131A: Transition away from deprecated algorithms
  - NSA CNSA 2.0: Quantum-resistant algorithms by 2035
  - FIPS 140-3: Approved PQC algorithms in cryptographic modules

References to relevant compliance frameworks and deadlines.

Interpreting Results¶

Readiness Score¶

The PQC readiness score (0-100%) is calculated as:

score = (SAFE×100 + TRANSITIONAL×50 + DEPRECATED×20 + UNSAFE×0) / total

High Readiness Score (80-100%)¶

Most assets are SAFE or have long migration timelines. Continue monitoring PQC standards.

Medium Readiness Score (50-79%)¶

Typical for current environments. Most assets are TRANSITIONAL with 2035+ break years. Begin planning migrations.

Low Readiness Score (0-49%)¶

Significant exposure to deprecated or unsafe algorithms. Prioritize: 1. Replace all DEPRECATED assets immediately 2. Migrate UNSAFE assets within 12 months 3. Create roadmap for TRANSITIONAL assets

Algorithm Classification Reference¶

Quantum-Safe (SAFE)¶

Algorithm	Type	Notes
ML-KEM-512/768/1024	Key encapsulation	NIST FIPS 203
ML-DSA-44/65/87	Digital signature	NIST FIPS 204
SLH-DSA	Digital signature	NIST FIPS 205
AES-256	Symmetric cipher	128-bit post-quantum security
SHA-256/384/512	Hash	Collision-resistant
SHA3-256/384/512	Hash	Keccak-based
ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD	256-bit key

Transitional¶

Algorithm	Type	Break Year
RSA-2048	Signature/Encryption	2035
RSA-3072	Signature/Encryption	2040
RSA-4096	Signature/Encryption	2045
ECDSA-P256	Signature	2035
ECDSA-P384	Signature	2040
Ed25519	Signature	2035
X25519	Key exchange	2035
AES-128	Symmetric cipher	Post-quantum secure*

*AES-128 provides 64-bit post-quantum security under Grover's algorithm.

Deprecated¶

Algorithm	Type	Issue
MD5	Hash	Collision attacks
SHA-1	Hash	Collision attacks
RC4	Stream cipher	Multiple breaks
DES	Block cipher	56-bit key
3DES	Block cipher	Meet-in-middle attacks

Unsafe¶

Algorithm	Type	Issue
RSA-1024	Signature/Encryption	Factorable today
DSA	Signature	Implementation vulnerabilities
ECDSA-P192	Signature	Insufficient security margin
DH-1024	Key exchange	Precomputation attacks

Example Workflow¶

Generate CBOM with PQC Report¶

./cbom-generator \
    --discover-services \
    --plugin-dir plugins \
    --format cyclonedx \
    --cyclonedx-spec 1.7 \
    --pqc-report /tmp/migration-report.txt \
    --output /tmp/system-cbom.json \
    /usr /etc

Query PQC Statistics from CBOM¶

# View readiness score
cat /tmp/system-cbom.json | jq '.metadata.properties[] |
    select(.name | startswith("cbom:pqc"))'

# Count unsafe algorithms
cat /tmp/system-cbom.json | jq '[.components[] |
    select(.properties[]? |
        select(.name == "cbom:pqc:status" and .value == "UNSAFE"))] | length'

# List all critical migrations needed
cat /tmp/system-cbom.json | jq '.components[] |
    select(.properties[]? |
        select(.name == "cbom:pqc:migration_urgency" and .value == "CRITICAL")) |
    {name, status: .properties[] | select(.name == "cbom:pqc:status") | .value}'

View Migration Report Summary¶

# View the readiness score
grep "Overall Score" /tmp/migration-report.txt

# Count critical assets
grep "CRITICAL" /tmp/migration-report.txt | head -5

# View recommendations
sed -n '/RECOMMENDATIONS/,/SUMMARY/p' /tmp/migration-report.txt

Using the Report for Compliance¶

The PQC migration report can be used for:

Executive Briefings: The summary statistics and readiness score provide management-level visibility
Compliance Audits: Demonstrates awareness and planning for post-quantum requirements
Budget Justification: Quantifies the scope of migration work needed
Project Planning: The phased action plan provides a starting point for migration projects
Risk Assessment: The risk matrix supports enterprise risk management processes

PQC in CBOM Output¶

Overview¶

PQC Status Categories¶

SAFE¶

TRANSITIONAL¶

DEPRECATED¶

UNSAFE¶

Classification Philosophy¶

Libraries: Worst-Case Classification¶

Services/Applications: Best-Case Classification¶

Break Year Estimates¶

Migration Urgency Levels¶

Readiness Score¶

PQC KEX Detection¶

Enabling PQC in Selected Services¶

OpenSSH (v9.0+)¶

Nginx (OpenSSL 3.2+)¶

Apache (OpenSSL 3.2+)¶

CBOM Output Properties¶

Component Properties¶

Metadata Properties¶

The PQC Migration Report¶

Generating the Report¶

Report Sections¶

Executive Summary¶

Vulnerability Breakdown by Break Year¶

Migration Priority Timeline¶

NIST PQC Standards Reference¶

Specific Recommendations¶

Risk Assessment Matrix¶

PQC Readiness Score¶

Phased Migration Action Plan¶

Compliance References¶

Interpreting Results¶

Readiness Score¶

High Readiness Score (80-100%)¶

Medium Readiness Score (50-79%)¶

Low Readiness Score (0-49%)¶

Algorithm Classification Reference¶

Quantum-Safe (SAFE)¶

Transitional¶

Deprecated¶

Unsafe¶

Example Workflow¶

Generate CBOM with PQC Report¶

Query PQC Statistics from CBOM¶

View Migration Report Summary¶

Using the Report for Compliance¶

See Also¶